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1. Introduction 
The study of the normative evaluation of attention – and salience, this paper argues, has the 
potential for being rich field that intersects with debates in moral philosophy, the theory of 
rationality, and in epistemology. This paper lays the groundwork and provides a framework for 
such a study.  
Suppose that you had no other information about a person than what she focuses her attention 
on, how much she tends to pay attention to this or to that, what is salient to her and what isn’t, 
what has a tendency to grab her attention, and what she tends to ignore, and about how much 
she has the capacity to control her attention. Even with just only information about a person’s 
attention, you would know a lot about the life of that person. You can paint a picture of her 
character, her values, what she cares about, and her likely beliefs and preferences. Information 
about someone’s attention, in other words, allows us to give a rich account of the structure of a 
person’s mind, her experience and life using only a single psychological term. A psychological 
theory of a person that uses attention as its only primitive psychological term would plausibly 
be rich in its expressive capacities.   
This exercise, minimally, shows that attention is a mental phenomenon that dramatically shapes 
human agency and experience, including scientific and moral inquiry – at least as much as 
perception, belief, and desire (cf. Watzl 2017). What we attend to and how we attend is a crucial 
factor that influences and provides form to our individual and collective lives (Watzl 2011, 
2017; Ganeri 2018; Dicey-Jennings 2020). 
Given that attention is such a central factor in shaping our lives we would like to know: what 
normative pressures are there on how we should attend: what are good and what are bad ways 
of attending? What, in a specific situation, should be salient to an agent? Should she control her 
attention in that situation, or let her mind wander? And what, generally, should be more and 
what should be less salient to us? Are there general truths about how much control we should 
exercise over attention? To what degree are we responsible for how we attend? 
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We can begin our investigation with a label. Since the time of the famous debate between 
Clifford (1877) and James (1896), the study of norms of belief, and if there are any, has evolved 
to be rich, multi-faceted and tightly structured field between epistemology, philosophy of mind, 
action theory, decision theory, and ethics about those normative issues and how they relate to 
the nature of belief. Discussions regarding which norms, if any, govern our practices of 
forming, maintaining and relinquishing beliefs have come to be collected under the label “The 
ethics of belief” (cf Chignell 2018). Included in the ethics of belief are debates about how those 
normative issues relate to the nature of belief. 
This paper concerns an analogous set of questions regarding our practices of attention. “The 
ethics of attention” in the title of this paper thus concerns the discussion of which norms, if any, 
govern our practices of attention: what norms govern what we should attend to, how we should 
engage our capacity for attention, when we should begin and when we should stop to pay 
attention to something? Like the ethics of belief, the ethics of attention connects those 
normative questions to issues regarding the nature of attention, what may or may not be subject 
to such normative pressures: how, for example, are salience and attention related? To what 
degree can we control our attention? How are different forms of attention related to each other? 
In the public debate, topics in the ethics of attention tend to figure prominently. 
Think about discussions of spin doctors and troll factories (or certain political actors): they 
misdirect and distract; they direct attention to what is irrelevant and to information that is false 
or radically incomplete. Those who criticize either those actors or those who fall for them make 
claims in the ethics of attention: they argue that it is criticizable to misdirect someone’s 
attention, or that it is wrong to pay attention to what is false. 
Or think of the debates about statues, paintings, or history books: the presence of the great men 
of history in these places gives them a lot of everyone’s attention. Our social and physical 
environments are, literally, engineered and created for certain patterns of attention. Attention 
in thought, in sympathy, but also in perceptual, in visual or auditory attention: the statues at the 
central squares are literally designed to be looked at. Many, in the contemporary debate, argue 
that this focus is inappropriate. The painter Titus Kaphar, for example, tries to show with his 
art that the dreams and hopes of the slave boy, who is depicted the background of a painting or 
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as leading the horse of a general, they too deserve our attention.1 Kaphar argues for a claim in 
the ethics of attention: justice demands changes in our attentional patterns.  
Yet, when we look to professional philosophy the study of the ethics of attention is more or less 
undeveloped compared with rich, complex, and systematic investigation of the ethics of belief. 
While the normative evaluation of our own and other’s attention is a rich aspect of ordinary 
normative thought and hence the normative questions I’ve discussed sound familiar, the 
majority of contemporary normative philosophy, from moral theory, to epistemology and 
decision theory, contains no systematic discussion of attention norms. 
Compare the rich epistemological discussion on what we should believe and how we should 
update our beliefs in response to evidence: in these debates the logical landscape of various 
options, questions and positions has been well mapped out. A lot of progress has been made in 
the ethics of belief since Clifford’s original paper. By contrast, the study of norms of attention 
has remained fairly unstructured: what exactly is being evaluated? What types of normative 
pressures on attention are there? How does the normative assessment of attention relate to 
discussions in, for example, moral philosophy, epistemology or decision theory? 
Why is there currently no ethics of attention? Arguably, there are at least two reasons. First, 
one might argue that attention is not the kind of "thing" that is amenable to the relevant type of 
normative assessment. I will call this the wrong kind of object objection. In the next section I 
will answer this objection and show that attention is an appropriate target for serious normative 
investigation. Second, one might argue that even if attention in principle can be assessed 
normatively, no systematic normative investigation can be given. The second part of this paper 
shows that such a systematic investigation can be provided by developing a framework for such 
an investigation. This framework classifies potential norms of attention along three dimensions: 
whether they are manner or object based, instrumental or non-instrumental, and whether its 
source is moral, prudential or epistemic. I will use this framework to locate proposals for norms 
of attention in the literature, and in order to situate the normative discussion of attention within 
the wider field of normative philosophy. 
2. The Wrong Kind of Object Objection 
Theoretical engagement with attention in academia since the mid 20th century has been 
dominated by a complex, and multi-faceted discussion in cognitive psychology and the 
 
1 See: https://www.ted.com/talks/titus_kaphar_can_art_amend_history?language=en  
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neurosciences. While there can be no doubt that this investigation has enabled progress in our 
understanding of attention, the view of attention as a special topic of those sciences can get in 
the way of bringing normative questions about attention into clear view. Once we think of 
attention in terms of a set of neuronal or psychological mechanisms, questions about good or 
bad forms of attention, questions of how attention figures in moral considerations, in the 
assessment of the character of a person, or its proper role in epistemic inquiry, can appear to be 
misguided: neuronal or psychological mechanisms may seem not to be the right kind of thing 
about for which such normative questions can be properly posed.  
One reason for why the mechanistic picture of attention tends to push its normative assessment 
out of view is that the normative questions concern the whole person (what should she do, does 
she have good character), while attention – on this picture – is viewed as a sub-personal 
phenomenon, whose nature is not constitutively bound to the person as such. 
Yet, the fact that there exists a rich sub-personal science of attention does not imply that 
attention just is a sub-personal phenomenon. Just consider that much is also known about sub-
personal perceptual processes; and yet it is the subject who perceives her surroundings; the sub-
personal processes underpin and enable the subject’s perceptual state. Similarly, a person’s 
conscious experience is arguably the paradigm of a personal level phenomenon – the subject’s 
own subjective point of view, as it is sometimes described. And yet, sub-personal processes 
underpin and enable that conscious experience. A first step toward a serious normative 
investigation of attention thus is to take seriously the idea that attention, like perception and 
conscious experience, is a personal level phenomenon: attending is something the person does; 
attention processes are what underpins that attending. For the normative investigation of 
attention, we want a framework that seriously treats attention as a personal level phenomenon 
and shows how, as such, it is integrated with other personal level phenomena such as perception, 
belief, desire, or conscious experience. 
Another reason for why attention can easily slip away from normative investigation is that it 
can seem so variegated as to lack the kind of unity that a proper target of such investigation 
would seem to need. In one form attention is perceptual: a subject focuses her attention on one 
(or some) perceptually presented item over others Perceptual attention can be highly focused 
(directed only at one or a few objects or features) or it can be dispersed through a whole scene. 
But attention also comes in other, non-perceptual, forms: your attention might be occupied by 
a pain or feeling (as opposed to a pain that doesn’t distract you; one that you only feel in the 
periphery of your mind). It may also be occupied by a train of thought like planning for your 
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friend’s birthday, as opposed to thoughts that pass through your mind on their own accord while 
your attention is occupied with something else. Finally, your attention might be occupied by an 
embodied action: consider playing soccer with all your attention, as opposed to kicking some 
balls while your mind is occupied with the birthday planning. How could there be a normative 
theory that treats perceptual focus, getting distracted by a feeling of nausea, and the attentive 
engagement in sports in anything like a unified manner? To make matters worth, while some 
instances of attention are paradigmatic voluntary actions, like when I, just like that, shift my 
attention, with mental effort from the melody of the guitar solo in a concert to the rhythm played 
by the drums, some other cases, seem passive and involuntary, like when my attention is drawn, 
against my will, to a beeping phone that disturbs the concert. The type of normative assessment 
appropriate for a phenomenon, according to many views, crucially depends on whether that 
phenomenon is under voluntary control: just consider moral responsibility or the ethics of 
belief. For a normative theory of attention, we thus want a framework that unifies the variety 
of forms of attention and that lets us see how they are connected. 
The priority structure view of attention (Watzl 2017) provides an answer to these concerns. 
According to this view attention consists in the agent’s activity of regulating priority structures, 
which order the parts of the subject’s on-going (occurrent) mental life by their relative priority 
to the subject. 
This priority structure view unifies the varieties of attention. Perceptual attention consists in 
prioritizing some parts of your overall perceptual state over other parts of that state. If your 
attention is visually focused on an object, then the state of seeing that object is prioritized over 
other part of that visual state. Attention to external objects thus gets explained by relative 
priority of aspects of the subject’s mind. When attention is focused on a feature (like the timbre 
or colour of the object or event) then the state of seeing those features is prioritized. Prioritizing 
orders the parts of the subject’s perceptual state by their relative priority to the subject, thus 
allowing for degrees of attention as we move up or down that ordering. When attention is non-
perceptual what is prioritized is a non-perceptual aspect or part of the subjects on-going mental 
life. What is prioritized may be a bodily sensation or feeling, or the parts of perceptual 
experience, mental images, occurring ideas, and occurrent desires that are constitutive of an 
embodied action or train of thought. The priority structure view thus unifies all forms of 
attention by taking as the primary notion the notion of a mental state’s relative priority for the 
subject. The forms differ only in which aspect of the subject’s mind has the highest relative 
priority. 
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The priority structure view also unifies passive and active forms of attention. Attention is a 
mental activity, a personal level on-going process. A person, on my view, is always engaged in 
that activity. We are constantly regulating our priority structures. Yet, while this is something 
we are doing (and attention is thus agential, and within the realm of our responsibility), how 
we are doing what we are doing is subject to both an active and a passive force. The passive 
force shapes the activity to the degree to which the regulating of priority structures is influenced 
by what is salient to the subject during that period, where the salience of a mental state roughly 
consists in the degree to with that mental state commands prioritization (a type of imperatival 
content). Salience is a feature of subject level states, but it is not under the subject’s control 
(just like the content of a perceptual state is subject level but not controlled by the subject). The 
active force interacts with that passive force and shapes the subject’s prioritizing to the degree 
to which she herself guides her own activity. Such guidance can take all forms that it can also 
take for bodily action. Attention is subject to deliberation (you may weigh reasons for and 
against focusing more attention on one group of people rather than another), normative 
judgment (you might think it best to focus on one group), intention, desire and choice (you may 
choose to attend to A rather than B), and fine-grained online control (cf. research on visual 
search).  
The central notion in this framework is the notion of a priority structure, where the relevant 
parts of the agent’s mental life are compared by their relative priority or priority weight. The 
framework allows for different forms of development depending on how one thinks of the 
relevant notion of priority. In my own view, relative priority does not have a reductive 
definition. We have a grip on the relevant notion through its reflection in conscious experience: 
here relative priority shapes the field of consciousness into centre and periphery. One way to 
take this is to think of our conscious acquaintance with how peripheral or central a part of our 
mind is as fixing the reference to an underlying type of relation between those parts of our mind 
(this view allows that once reference is fixed the relevant relation may also hold between 
unconscious mental states).  
3. Content-based and manner-based attention norms 
The priority structure framework gives us a clear target for the normative assessment of 
attention. Norms of attention are norms for the regulation of priority structures. I will now begin 
to develop a framework for the study of norms of attention within the priority structure view. 
A first dimension is between what I will call content-based and manner-based attention norms. 
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We can think of the priority structures I have introduced in two tiers. On tier 1, the elements of 
the structure are mental states that occupy the subject’s attention to various degrees, and the 
relation between them is their relative priority to the subject (we can allow for ties in relative 
priority). If I’m paying more attention to the drums than to the instrumental solo, then my 
hearing the drums has strict priority in my mind compared hearing the solo. Seeing the other 
audience members will be lower in priority rank even to the hearing of the solo. Or if I’m so 
excited about a possibility that I keep thinking about it and notice little of my surroundings, 
then my excitement and thoughts about the possibility are prioritized over my experience of the 
world around me. On tier 2, the elements of the structure are external items and the structure 
orders them by how much the person attends to them. The ordering in tier 1 determines an 
ordering in tier 2. Tier 2 characterizes the world as it is according to the attention occupiers. 
We can think of the structure elements at tier 2 as the intentional objects of the structure 
elements at tier 1. If there are non-intentional, non-directed aspects of the mind (a nausea or a 
headache that occupies your attention may be examples), then there is more to tier 1 than can 
be captured in tier 2. Also, if a part of the world is, as it were, attended “twice over” like when 
you both look at rustling leaves and listen to them, then we can capture details in the subject’s 
attention on tier 1 that will be lost if we only consider tier 2.  
With these two tiers in place, we can now define content-based attention norms as those norms 
that are exclusively formulated at tier 2. Manner-based attention norms, by contrast, are those 
that pertain directly to how the person’s mind is organized at tier 1.  
Content-based norms, then, are what is described when we say that a person should pay more 
attention to X than to Y, that she should not completely ignore the Fs, that it would be 
appropriate if people paid more attention to X, or that a virtuous person is one who pays enough 
attention to certain features of the world.  
Content-based norms will ignore in what way a person pays attention to something, and instead 
are concerned with a coarser level of detail: a person should – in some way or other – pay 
attention to certain features. 
As an example, where such coarse graining appears appropriate consider a hiring process (see 
Greenwald and Banaji 2013; see also Siegel 2016, this volume for discussion). Suppose that 
person evaluating various résumés harbours an unconscious prejudice against members of a 
certain group (the out-group). As a result and as a reflection of that prejudice, the evaluator 
pays little attention to the strong parts of the résumé of outgroup members, while she pays much 
more attention to weaker parts of their CVs. By contrast, when she considers the résumé of an 
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in-group member, she pays a lot of attention to the strong parts and comparatively little attention 
to the weak parts. We may want to say that this distribution of attention is normatively 
criticisable (below I will discuss ways of thinking of the normative source of that critique). 
Arguably, though, it is normatively irrelevant how she re-distributes her attention. She may 
make sure to perceptually focus her attention equally on all relevant parts of the CVs, she may 
make sure to give enough thought to all parts after she has looked at them, or she may counteract 
her bias by directing her attention in her imagination to the qualities that a person with that CV 
is likely to have.  
Note that tier 2 structures in the first place provide and ordering of attended items, but probably 
do not define an interval scale (we can’t define: x receives twice as much attention as y). But, 
if the structures are “big enough” we can define rough degrees by the number of actual and 
potential intermediate elements (cf Watzl 2017, p. 82). Sometimes, as plausibly in this case, a 
normative evaluation may want to say that a person ought to attend much more to one thing 
rather than another, and not merely pay a little more attention to that thing. 
Note also that each priority structure already contains the information about what is and what 
is not included in the subject’s current mental life. For the moment neglect the structuring 
relation, and just think of a tier 1 structure as a set mental states. We can think of that set as a 
partioning of the space of potential mental states, into those that the subject actually has and 
those that she does not have (just like the set of all of a subject’s beliefs, i.e. every proposition 
she believes, partitions the space of possible beliefs into those the subject has and those she 
doesn’t have, i.e. propositions believed and those not believed). Two priority structures can 
differ simply in that one contains an element that the other does not contain. So, by being given 
a certain priority structure, we already know what is excluded from it. If you ‘overthink’ a 
situation, tier 2 attention norms can express the idea that that thought should not have entered 
your mind. You should not have attended to that situation at all. 
As a second example, and arguably in the present context more controversial, consider gratitude 
(see Bommarito (2013), and Chappell and Yetter-Chappell (2016)). Someone who possesses 
the virtue of gratitude (who is a grateful person) must pay a sufficient amount of attention to 
the value of what others have done for her. Someone who merely knows that others have done 
something valuable, or is peripherally aware of that value, but pays no attention to that value is 
not grateful. “[A]ttention is essential to the virtue. We cannot be grateful by simply being aware 
that someone has helped us”, as Bommarito (2013, p. 100) puts it. It is thus plausible that good 
character is characterized by paying enough attention to the value of what other do for us. But 
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arguably it, again, doesn’t matter how we pay attention to it: whether we perceptually take it 
in, when it is happening, by thinking attentively about it, or by often imagining how valuable 
those deeds were.  
Yet, the example of gratitude also illustrates the limits of content-based approaches to attention 
norms. Suppose that, as Bommarito observes, that a “teenager under the influence of Nietzsche 
might attend to the support of his or her parents but take it to be evidence of how disgustingly 
weak Mom and Dad are.” (ibid.). This observation is certainly correct: not all ways of attending 
to the help of others are a sign of gratitude. There are two ways of taking this observation. On 
the one hand, we may leave the relevant norm of attention at the content level and provide a 
fuller characterization of gratitude by supplementing having the right attention structure with, 
for example, having the right emotions directed at the supporting person. On the other hand, we 
may take Bommarito’s observation as showing that the content-based assessment of attention 
in this case is insufficient. If the subject attends to the value of another’s help by prioritizing 
negative emotions directed at those values, then that distribution of attention makes no 
contribution to her gratitude. Whether we go one way or the other here plausibly depends on 
whether we think that a positive contribution of attention can be separated out even if the 
subject’s emotions are misguided: is the person at least partially grateful if she attends to the 
value of others, even if that attention is accompanied by spite? If yes, then we have a content-
based attention norm as a partial component of gratitude. If no, then we are here really dealing 
with a manner-based attention norm. 
Let us then get to manner-based attention norms. Here, as I said, we are concerned not with 
what the subject pays attention to, but with tier 1 that concerns the organization of the subject’s 
mental life. We thus look in more detail at the way a subject pays attention to something. 
We have already seen one example of how to distinguish such ways: which mental states are 
prioritized over others. Suppose, for example, we would like to say, as Iris Murdoch (1970) 
does, that morality requires that a person should pay attention to the concrete other subjects she 
is engaged with (a “just and loving gaze directed on an individual reality”, p.33). Staring, 
perceptually, at others plausibly is not a way of fulfilling that normative requirement: rather 
what should occupy our attention is reflective thought about others as loci of intrinsic value and 
worth (though, again, the manner based treatment could be debated: if we can see intrinsic value 
and worth, then maybe the prioritization of such seeing is a way of encountering the other 
appropriately; see e.g. Werner (2014) for discussion of whether moral properties are 
perceptible). As another example, consider the positive evaluation of attentive touch, especially 
 10 
the “close form of caring touch that forms an essential element of social bonding and human 
development” (Fulkerson 2015). There clearly is a good that pertains to the tactile attentive 
engagement with close others (family, friends, children and loved ones). Mere inattentive touch 
does not seem to have the same value; and equally importantly it is attentive touch that is 
valuable, mere attentive thought or seeing does not have the same value (though it may have 
other values). 
Another way of distinguishing ways of attention is by considering how a subject’s priority 
structures are regulated. Here we can distinguish, as I mentioned, a passive force on the 
evolution of those structures in terms of what is salient to the subject and an active force, when 
a subject guides her attention, for example, with direct and effortful control.  
One can argue both that a special value attaches to forms of passively evolving attention 
structures and to the active control over attention. For the first, consider another example from 
Bommarito and Chappell and Yetter-Chappell (2016): the role of attention in modesty. 
Chappell and Yetter-Chappell (2016) argue, correctly I believe, that a modest agent is “one who 
is not disposed to find their own positive attributes especially salient” (p. 457). She hardly ever 
finds herself pulled to give attention to those positive attributes. She may have an accurate view 
of her positive traits but doesn’t find them particularly salient. Maybe, indeed, in line with 
Yetter Chappell and Yetter-Chappell’s observations, a modest person actually does spend much 
of her time attending to her positive attributes: maybe she is paid to look into them and 
intentionally and effortfully gives them her attention. But such attention requires effort for her. 
It’s painful. For the modest person, attending to her own positive attributes is not automatic 
(while the immodest person feels the pull to attend to those attributes). Other plausible examples 
of salience constituted virtues discussed by Chappell and Yetter-Chappell are: being a good 
friend might be constituted by finding the friend’s positive attitudes more salient than her 
negative attitudes, someone who is able to “forgive and forget” finds past wrongs not 
particularly salient (she need not actually have forgotten about them; she is just not drawn to 
attend to them). These examples illustrate the positive value that may attach to manners of 
attention that without control evolve in the right direction. 
On the opposite side, consider that we may also positively evaluate being in control of our 
attention. Immanuel Kant (1775-76, p. 62) expresses an extreme version of such an evaluation 
when he says that “[t]he greatest perfection of the powers of the mind is based on our 
subordinating them to our power of choice … For this sake, attention … [is] only the useful for 
us, if [it is] under the free power of choice, so that involuntary attentiveness … produce[s] much 
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harm.” While we might not want to follow Kant that attention is “only useful” if it is “under 
the free power of choice”, we may still believe that having enough control over our own 
attention and being able to guide it according to our own values is an important and valuable 
aspect of self-control and personal integrity. 
It is not my goal here to evaluate such proposals, but only to use them as illustrations of norms 
of attention that pertain to the manner of attention, and not what it is that we attend to. 
4. Instrumental and Non-Instrumental Attention Norms 
I now get to a second dimension of the framework: we can distinguish different types of 
attention norms. We can, on the one hand, evaluate an agent’s priority structures and how she 
regulates them instrumentally, i.e. with regard to an end that is achieved through that form of 
attention, or we can evaluate attention non-instrumentally, i.e. evaluate a form of attention on 
its own without regard to its upshots. One important debate in this area concerns whether there 
are any non-instrumental attention norms, and if not, why not. 
With Immanuel Kant’s negative evaluation of “involuntary attentiveness” we have already seen 
a clear case of an instrumental attention norm: Kant seems to think that such involuntariness is 
problematic because it “produce[s] much harm.” What is normatively problematic thus 
concerns the consequences of such a manner of attending. For a similarly instrumental, though 
less one-sided, evaluation of the relative costs and benefits of controlled and un-controlled 
forms of attention, consider Chandra Sripada’s (2018) discussion of the costs and benefits of 
mind-wandering (i.e. when our cognitive, non-perceptual attention hops uncontrolled from one 
thought to the other). Such mind-wandering sometimes may have negative consequences: it 
prevents you from achieving routine daily goals and may make you feel bad about yourself 
(Killingsworth and Gilbert 2010). On the other hand, arguably there are also good 
consequences: it may distract from boredom, and might lead to escape routines, and lead to 
insight and deep learning (what Sripada calls the advantages of “exploration”).  
Consider also one way of looking at the hiring case I have discussed. One thing that is 
problematic about the unequal distribution of attention to the good and not so good aspects of 
the CVs of in-group and out-group members is that as a consequence, a so prejudiced evaluator 
will tend to not hire the best person for the job. She will miss out on candidates she would have 
wanted to hire (Banaji and Greenwald 2013). Her distribution of attention thus is problematic 
because it is an ill-calibrated instrument for the purpose to which it is put.  
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Not all instrumental attention norms will have to do with prudence alone: with what best 
satisfies the desires of the agent. Consider mindfulness meditation. Such meditation is 
constitutively characterized by certain attention structures: the Oxford English Dictionary, for 
example, describes meditation generally as ways of "focus[ing] one's mind for a period of 
time"2 in specifically prescribed ways. Mindfulness specifically has been characterized by the 
idea that the agent intentionally makes higher order thoughts about her first order experiences 
a center of her experience (cf. Latham 2016). 
Mindfulness meditation, by its practitioners and advocates, is often described as a good thing. 
They advocate an ethics of attention. What, though, is supposed to be good about it? It might 
serve as an epistemic tool, maybe delivering better insight into the true nature of the soul 
(though see Ratnayake and Merre 2018 for a critique), and – of course – it is widely promoted 
as a practical tool, helping to reduce anything from stress, anxiety, to substance abuse and 
chronic pain, and promoting increased quality of life and increased prosocial attitudes (whether 
it succeeds in those regards is another matter, e.g. Goyal et al. 2014 for a recent meta-studies 
suggesting scepticism). Many practitioners and many traditions in which mindfulness 
meditation is important, though reject the instrumental approach (cf Purser 2019 for a critique 
of such uses of mindfulness). They might advocate mindfulness and meditation practices as a 
good way of life. Mindfulness training ought, they would say, not just help an agent realize 
goals she already antecedently possesses. The instrumental approach does not do justice to the 
transformative effect mindfulness and meditations practices have. It helps the agent to become 
a better more virtuous person: it helps the agent, for example, to be more compassionate. 
Through that training to focus her mind on her own feelings, experiences, and emotions 
generally she will be in a position to notice anger toward others before it “takes a hold of her”. 
It thus helps her realize moral concern and compassion. Such an evaluation of attention would 
still fall under the instrumental approach: priority structures get evaluated only instrumentally, 
by how well they serve to realize an independently given good or virtuous trait. 
Are all norms of attention instrumental norms, i.e. norms that evaluate attention according to 
its consequences? Arguably this is not so. 
An instrumental approach treats the relationship between the attention structures and the 
relevant good (e.g. compassion) as akin to a means-end relation. But arguably the relationship 
between the attention structures and certain virtues is closer than that: the virtue is constituted 
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in part by certain attention structures. What it is for an agent to have that type of virtue is for 
her to have certain attention structures – both synchronically as well as diachronically. If an 
attention structure is constitutive of a virtuous character trait, then it can not only be evaluated 
instrumentally. It is part of what it is to be an agent with that virtue to have specific attention 
structures. We have already seen some plausible examples of this type: gratitude and modesty 
may both be constituted by certain forms of attention (on either tier 1 or tier 2). 
Attention thus can be evaluated non-instrumentally if it is a constitutive aspect of a feature or 
state that can itself be evaluated non-instrumentally. What, aside from virtues like gratitude, 
may be examples of such features or states? One interesting area of investigation concerns the 
question whether some attention structures are constitutive of epistemically evaluable states. 
Among these would be positively evaluated states such as knowledge, justified belief, or 
understanding, but also negatively evaluated states like prejudice.  
For a potential example, consider that (at least) sometimes whether an agent knows something 
may constitutively depend on whether she has attended in the right way. Consider a doctor 
aiming to discover whether her patient has cancer. She looks through the patient's files and has 
only a quick glance at an X-ray (but doesn’t pay much attention to it). From the evidence she 
has considered, it is reasonable to conclude that the patient is healthy. But had she paid more 
attention to the X-ray, she would have noticed a lump. While the patient is in fact healthy, let 
us suppose, had the doctor considered the lump this would have undermined her justification to 
think that the patient is healthy. One might argue (see Pollock 1986, Goldberg 2015) that the 
doctor here does not know that the patient is healthy because she had the wrong tier 2 attention 
structures. One might take such cases to show that knowledge of certain facts requires that the 
agent inquires into the matter properly and responsibly. But in order to inquire into the matter 
properly and responsibly she must pay attention to the right things (cf. Fairweather and 
Montemayor 2017). But now we seem to have a non-instrumentally evaluable attention 
structure: whether or not the agent cares about knowing anything in this domain, there is a type 
of epistemic evaluation of the attention structure available. 
There is an interesting question whether some relation less demanding than constitution might 
also lead to non-instrumentally evaluable attention structures. Return also to the hiring example 
for illustration. One form of evaluation, as we have seen, is instrumental: the evaluator should 
be equal attention to the good parts of all CVs because only then will she be able to hire the 
most qualified person. But arguably there is also another form of evaluation: the prejudiced 
outlook is irrational (see Siegel 2016 for further discussion). With no evidence (or indeed 
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against available evidence) the evaluator takes outgroup members to be generally less qualified. 
Siegel (2016, forthcoming) argues that a tendency to have certain priority structures is itsel 
irrational when it is in a specific sense she defines based on having such an irrational outlook: 
if we would like to say that the irrational outlook is non-instrumentally problematic, then the 
priority structure that is based on it it will itself be non-instrumentally evaluable. 
As I mentioned, whether there are any non-instrumental attention norms will be a matter of 
substantial debate. For now, I hope to have sketched the distinction between instrumental and 
non-instrumental attention norms enough for such a debate to get started. 
5. The normative source of attention norms 
I now get to a final distinction among different attention norms. This distinction concerns the 
normative source of the relevant norms. 
A first source are prudential considerations. Having certain priority structures, and certain ways 
of regulating those structures over time can be evaluated according to how good those structures 
are for the agent who has them. Many instrumental attention norms have such a prudential 
source. Consider, for example, as we have discussed the costs and benefits of mind-wandering. 
Mind-wandering may get in the way of an agent’s pursuits of long term goals, and in that sense 
it is bad for the agent. But it may also be beneficial if it enables deep learning and serve as a 
source for welcome distraction. Prudential considerations generally pertain to the wellbeing of 
the agent: to what is good for her (see Crisp 2017). Well-being her may be thought of in terms 
of desire satisfaction: how well does a priority structure serve the agent in order to satisfy her 
desires. But well-being can also be thought of in terms of the overall balance of pleasure and 
pain, or in terms of what is objectively good for the agent (one might, for example, hold that 
friendship or knowledge and understanding is good for the agent independently how whether it 
is associated with pleasure or pain or whether the agent has the relevant desires). An interesting 
question in this area concerns whether some forms of attention may themselves be in this way 
objectively good for the agent: maybe it is, for example, good for the agent to have enough 
control over her attention. Or consider when Marcus Aurelius says that “those who do not 
observe the movements of their own minds must of necessity be unhappy” (Aurelius, 
Meditations, 2nd book). Arguably, Aurelius here thinks that reflective attention to one’s own 
mind is objectively good for a person, and not just a means to satisfying her desires or because 
it will improve the overall balance of pleasure and pain. 
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A second source of attention norms are moral considerations. We have seen such a source at 
play when we considered the idea that the attention structures characteristic of meditation and 
mind-fullness may serve as an instrument toward instilling the moral virtue of compassion in 
an agent. And we have also seen examples of moral virtues, like gratitude or modesty, that may 
be partially constituted by certain forms of attention. In these cases, the fundamental object of 
moral evaluation is a certain character trait, and attention gets morally evaluated either 
instrumentally or because it partly constitutes a morally virtuous character trait. 
There is another virtue-theoretically inspired view that does not, though, take this indirect route 
toward the moral evaluation of attention structures.  On this view, the morally virtuous person 
is constituted by certain attention structures not because those are constitutive of specific 
character traits. Rather, some patterns of attention and salience just are themselves morally 
virtuous. Good character requires having the right motivational susceptibilities. We find that 
aspect of virtue and of morality emphasized in thinkers from Aristotle, Iris Murdoch, John 
Mcdowell, Lawrence Blum, up to recent work by Seanna Shiffrin. 
Which structures then ought the morally virtuous person to have? Arguably, there are several 
aspects. Arguably, it ought to be salient to her that a situation that has a moral or ethical 
dimension does have that dimension. For a virtuous person, for example, it will be salient that 
moral concerns about how we ought to live are a relevant aspect of her working environment. 
Further, the morally virtuous person ought to notice moral wrongs as moral wrongs (they ought 
to be high enough on her salience ordering). She pays attention to the situation of each 
individual without needing to consult a moral rule book.  Consider a case mentioned by 
Lawrence Blum (1991). He talks about a situation where two people, John and Joan, are on the 
subway together. There is another woman who is carrying a heavy shopping bag. John and Joan 
are both aware of that woman. But the fact that she is uncomfortable is salient to Joan while it 
isn’t particularly salient to John. Blum thinks that difference between what is salient to John 
and what is salient to Joan is of moral significance. While Joan’s attention is captured by the 
fact that a morally relevant value is at stake, John is not “attuned to” that morally significant 
fact. Blum thinks that the moral difference between John and Joan is not fully captured between 
how the difference in what is salient is going to make them act. If John is generally like that 
then this shows a “defect in his character … [h]e misses something of the moral reality 
confronting him”. 
Finally, Seanna Shiffrin (2016) argues that there are moral requirements of non-negligence. 
Those requirements include patterns of attention: “to be non-negligent is to be both attentive 
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and responsive in thought and agency to how the pursuit of one’s (permissible) aims and the 
state of one’s agency affect one’s ability to satisfy one’s other duties and responsibilities.” On 
Shiffrin’s view, it is an agent’s moral responsibility to pay enough attention to potential side 
effects of her doing. 
A third source of attention norms are epistemic considerations. We have encountered this 
source when we have considered whether certain priority structures are epistemically evaluable 
because they are constitutive either of certain forms of irrationality or of positive epistemic 
states such as knowledge or understanding.  
Just like for the case of morality, there is also an interesting question whether it may be a 
constitutive feature of an epistemically well-calibrated agent. Maybe, it is part of being 
epistemically well constituted that one pays attention to the right things? 
Consider the idea that science not just concerned with knowledge, but knowledge on matters of 
interest (Anderson 1995, Kitcher 2003). An ideal epistemic agent doesn’t just know random 
facts, but she knows and pays enough attention to important facts, facts that objectively merit 
our attention. This idea is deeply ingrained in our how we often think of cultural authority: it 
purports to identify things that are worth paying attention to  – ideas worth considering, books 
worth reading, creations worth beholding, problems worth solving, histories worth trying to 
reconstruct – even independent of antecedent social purpose. These things produce pro tanto 
rational pressure to pay attention to them, regardless of whether or not you have antecedent 
interest in them, knowledge about them, or desire to pay attention to what someone else says 
you should pay attention to. The seriousness with which we often debate what exactly belongs 
in the canon, what it is that “we all” epistemically speaking ought to pay some attention to here 
shows that it would be mistaken to simply and quickly attempt to push the relevant epistemic 
pressures on attention into prudential or moral considerations: it is at last a matter of serious 
debate whether the epistemic value of paying attention to important facts about the world and 
our place in it can sometimes outweigh moral or prudential considerations regarding what may 
lead us to improve our lot.  
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have attempted to improve our grip on the normative landscape with regard to 
attention. I have introduced the priority structure framework that gives us a clear target for the 
normative evaluation of attention. I then distinguished attention norms along three dimensions: 
(1) those norms may attach to the objects of attention or to the manner of attention (which I 
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have identified with tier 2 and tier 1 attention structures), (2) the norms may be instrumental 
and evaluate attention structures with regard to an independently specified consequence or they 
may be non-instrumental and evaluate attention independently of any further consequences, 
either because attention structures are constitutive or normatively charged states or features or 
because those structure themselves constitute a non-instrumental good. (3) the norms may have 
their source in prudential, moral, or epistemic considerations. Interesting in this regard are 
specifically whether certain attention structure may be non-instrumentally good both 
prudentially (because they constitute an agent’s wellbeing), morally (because they are 
constitutive of being morally well attuned to others) and epistemically (because they constitute 
inquiry into what objectively matters). 
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